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1. Introduction 
The objective of the paper is to contribute to a better understanding of the governance of the food 
networks focusing on two related aspect (Gibbons, 2005): the integration among the agents and the 
adaptation in the face of emerging disturbances.  
Integration of supply chains is often associated with interconnected business processes within and 
outside a firm’s boundaries (Jayaram, Tan, 2010). Integration is articulated mainly in terms of 
functions, interfaces and mechanisms, such as contracts and joint decision devices (Arshinder et al., 
2008). Vijayarasathy interpreted integration as a construct based upon the flow of goods, planning 
and control, organization and the flow of information (Vijayarasathy, 2010; van Dork and van der 
Vaart, 2005). Adaptation is a central problem of economic organisations (Williamson, 1985, 1991), 
and its conceptualisation is integrated within complementary theoretical perspectives (Gibbons, 
2005, 2010; Afuah, 2001; Arruñada et al. 2005; Gulati et al., 2005; Geyske et al., 2005; White, 
2005; MacNeil, 1978). 
After having elaborated and presented the theoretical framework, the paper illustrates and discusses 
six cases of governance agreement. Three cases concern with agreement arranged at the Italian 
National level, three cases regard regional level Food Networks. Beyond the differences in the 
institutional environments, the cases also differ because of the degree of integration. The paper 
contributes to the literature by corroborating the theoretical hypothesis (Gibbons, 2005; Wu, 2006) 
and providing empirical information about the management of Food Networks in the face of 
emerging disturbances in critical fields: sustainability, quality systems and innovation. 
The par.2 presents the objective and the method of the study. The analytical framework and the 
hypothesis are illustrated in the par.3. The par. 4 is dedicated to the empirical analysis. Final 
remarks are presented in the last paragraph. 
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2. Objectives and method 
The research method is based on the approach proposed by Yin (1994), according to the following 
scheme. First we developed the analytical framework drawing form literature and then identified  
theoretical propositions. We the introduce a testable conjecture on the basis of the causal structure 
proposed (Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 2010). The subsequent stage consists in searching for answering 
research questions which bring to the realization of a case study. Data searching was realized 
through documents analysis and unstructured interviews1. The elaboration of theoretical 
propositions, which represents the first step, uses existing theories which are the basis of the 
empirical research (Yin, 1994).   We chose six case diverse studies (Seawright and Gerring, 2008) 
under a confirmatory perspective. Drawing from the conceptual framework, the specific questions 
addressed in the study were: 
- are critical decision rights allocated across the firms boundaries to face uncertainty? 
- what are the circumstance under which the allocation is chosen by the parties? 
In our view to answer to these question contribute to corroborate (or not) the prediction drawn from 
the literature and it may also provide guidelines for designing agreement intended to the governance 
of Agro-industry networks. 
 
3. Analytical framework 
3.1 Food supply systems integration 
The integration of supply systems is basically conceived in terms of interconnection among the 
activities of network supply units across the firm’s boundaries (Jayaram, Tan, 2010; Omta et. al., 
2001, 2002; Huggins, 2008;  Vence et al., 2000; Krug, Hendrischke, 2008;  Hawkesworth, Imrie, 
2009). Scholars underline the fact the integration channels the flow of resources and products and 
requires  exchange of information and joint planning and control (Vijayarasathy, 2010; van Dork 
and van der Vaart, 2005). The integration entails the organization of the production processes and 
supply activities under a comprehensive perspectives under which all the units involved have to 
contribute to coordinate the use of material and immaterial resources as well as the exchange 
decisions. Under this perspective the integration of a supply system is the outcome of organizational 
choices aimed at taking advantage of the specialization without loosing the gains of cooperation. 
According to the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) integration as an outcome of  coordination 
decision requires choosing adequate governance structures (Williamson, 1985). Provided that the 
parties to a transaction align the characteristics of the governance structures (market, hybrid, 
hierarchy) to the transaction attributes (asset specificity, uncertainty, frequency) (Williamson, 
                                               
1
 One the authors has been also involved in the setting up of the agreement reported in the study. 
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1985), one question thus regards what governance structures are (or should be) chosen to 
integration purposes. Williamson (1991, 2005) states that as the asset specificity increases, the 
agents are induced to adopt more tightly coordinated forms of governance.  Furthermore, 
integration is based upon patterns of cooperation and coordination among the partners, patterns 
which are embodied by the governance structure in the parties relationships with a specific role for 
the opportunities of managing the emerging of ex post disturbances. This reflects circumstances of 
mutual interdependence associated to the necessity of maintaining legal autonomies of the parties:  
scholars have shown how, in such circumstances, complex institutional arrangements are 
established by agents, also entailing private and public orderings connections (Mènard, 2006; 
Gonzàlez-Diaz et al. 2003; Martinez et al., 2007).  Gibbons (2005) argued that an adaptation theory 
asks whether integration or non-integration better facilitates ‘adaptive, sequential decision making’ 
in the sense of Williamson (Gibbon, 2005: 205). Notably, the adaptation theory applies not only to 
make-or-buy problem, but also to a particular class of contracting problems, where two firms pass 
decisions rights across their boundaries by contract (Gibbons, 2005: 234). Under this view the 
integration is strictly associated with the adaptation processes of the governance structures adopted 
by the agents. In the following we summarize this theoretical perspective.  
 
3.2 Adaptation 
Adaptation is a central problem of economic organisations (Williamson, 1985, 1991), and its 
conceptualisation is integrated within complementary theoretical perspectives. Williamson (2005) 
focuses on the comparative efficiency with which alternative modes of governance affect good 
order during the ex-post contract implementation interval. Adaptation is based on workable, order-
preserving mechanisms for adapting to disturbances in services yielding mutual gains and for 
adjusting to the capacity of the parties of a long-term contract to incorporate hazard-mitigating 
mechanisms within the ex-ante contractual agreement (Williamson, 2003, 2005). Gulati et al. 
(2005) conceptualise adaptation in the vertical relationship in terms of differentiation, concerning 
the state of collaboration among the units, and integration, regarding the state of the segmentation 
of the organisational systems into subsystems. Ménard (2004, 2006) states that  hybrids aim to 
reduce the costs of contract specification and of the associated rigidities, by designing a general, 
relational, contractual framework.  
Gibbons (2005) subsumes the theme of adaptation in a complex theoretical structure by framing 
four elemental theories of the firm. Among them, the adaptation theory asks whether integration or 
non-integration better facilitates ‘adaptive, sequential decision making’ in the sense of Williamson 
(Gibbon, 2005, p. 205). Notably, the adaptation theory applies not only to make-or-buy problem, 
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but also to a particular class of contracting problems, where two firms pass decisions rights across 
their boundaries by contract (Gibbons, 2005, p. 234).  A key idea is that integration decision 
facilitate the parties relationship (Gibbons, 2005, p. 2009). Namely, Gibbons (2005, p. 235) 
assumes that an asset consists of three components: a vector of extricable decision rights d (which 
can be moved by contract, without changing the ownership of the asset); a vector of inextricable 
decisions rights  (which are controlled by the owner) and an inextricable payoff  (received by the 
owner). While decisions are not contractible ex post, the decision rights can be contracted ex ante 
(Gibbons, 2005, p. 213).  The parties negotiate ex ante the allocation of the critical decision rights 
to the party who is expected to maximize the total surplus: 
 
(1)   TSi    Es {U1(s, di (s)) + U2 (s, di (s))} 
 
where: 
 
TSi = total surplus, when the critical decision rights have been allocated to the party i=1, 2; 
di = critical decisions allocated to the party i = 1, 2; 
s = uncertain events observable ex post; 
U1 = utility function of the party i = 1, 2. 
  
Gibbons states that: “The key theoretical challenge in developing such a theory is to define an 
environment in which neither contracts ex ante nor renegotiation ex post can induce first-best 
adaptation after uncertainty is resolved, so that the second-best solution may be to concentrate 
authority in the hands of a “boss” who then makes (potentially self-interested) decisions after 
uncertainty is resolved” (Gibbons, 2005, p. 208). 
 
Namely, following Gibbons (2005, pp.229-231) let us indicate:  
 
aC contractible ex ante decisions 
N inalienable ex post  decisions that are not contractible ex post 
dN ex post decisions that are contractible ex ante 
0 observable signals 
It is assumed that not only that decisions are not contractible ex post but also that decision rights 
cannot be renegotiated ex post. Then, the adaptation theory as a model of ex post governance is 
structured in a formal integrative framework articulating the following timing (Gibbons, 2005: 230-
231): 
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I. the governance structure is negotiated contracting on the ex ante actions aC with the allocation of 
decision rights to the take the ex post decisions dN  that are not contractible ex post. 
II. Ex ante  actions chosen aC. 
III. Interim signals observed 0 
IV. Ex post decision taken d= (N, dN) 
V. Pay-off  U (a, d) received 
 
Figure 1: Adaptation theory - Timing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Namely: “the adaptation theory has no inalienable decision rights but explicitly considers the way 
different allocations of alienable decision rights facilitate “adaptive, sequential decision-making” as 
uncertainty is resolved.” (Gibbons, 2005, p. 230). Therefore the adaptive, sequential decision-
making is modelled in terms of contracting the ex ante allocation to one party of critical decisions 
rights (selected from the vector d) (stage I) who will take the decision (stage IV), having observed 
the state of the nature (stage III) unforeseeable at the time of the choice of the governance structure 
(stage I). The ex ante allocation of the decision rights to one party is thus the means the parties 
adopt to undertake the ex post adaptation to disturbances (Wu, 2006).  
On the basis of the adaptation theory we introduce then the following conjecture: 
 
H1: In the face of the uncertainty, the parties to a transaction in Agro-industry chains will integrate 
their activities by allocating critical decision rights to the party who is expected to maximize the 
total surplus 
 
We test this hypothesis by through the evidence of the empirical analysis. 
 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 
Governance structure 
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allocation of decision 
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ex post decisions dN 
Ex ante action 
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Interim signals 
observed 0 
Ex post 
decision taken 
d= (N, dN) 
  
Pay-off  U (a, 
d) received  
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4.1 The producers-processors contractual framework in the North Italian Sugar Network 
The sugar beet producers established national level Producers Associations (Associazione Nazionale 
Bieticoltori-ABI, Consorzio Bieticoltori Italiani-CBI, Associazione Bieticoltori Italiani-ABI) 
according to European law.  The main objective of these association is to concentrate and trade the 
sugar beet produced channelling it toward the processing stage. The table 1 summarize the recent 
evolution of the total Italian supply of sugar beet.  
 
 
Table 1: Production of Sugar Beet in Italy by geographical area    
                
        
Year    North Center South  Italy 
                
        
2000 UAA Ha  154547 52457 42146 249150 
 Production tons  8319477 1640172 1609532 11569181 
2001 UAA Ha  135790 49906 36897 222593 
 Production tons  7114253 1409045 1386513 9909811 
2002 UAA Ha  162213 46406 37097 245716 
 Production tons  8980235 2266264 1481291 12727790 
2003 UAA Ha  133641 41473 39056 214170 
 Production tons  4994150 938007 1204341 7136498 
2004 UAA Ha  118748 34777 32278 185803 
 Production tons  6103182 1088839 1281002 8473023 
2005 UAA Ha  169286.12 46900.18 36856.98 253043.28 
 Production tons  10552674.16 2122229.335 1480779.485 14155682.98 
2006 UAA Ha  58.179.078 14.194.510 19.729.890 92.103.478 
 Production tons  3.453.190.112 670.466.700 705.688.717 4.829.345.529 
2007 UAA Ha  60.207.160 12.347.410 13.083.680 85.638.250 
 Production tons  3.556.163.039 482.365.592 591.364.338 4.629.892.969 
2008 UAA Ha  48.929.240 2.298.380 9.943.990 61.171.610 
 Production tons  3.008.361.416 100.816.187 411.677.760 3.520.855.363 
                
Source: Authors elaboration  from ABI       
A general contractual agreement has been signed in 2011 between the Sugar Beet Producers 
Associations and the Co.Pro.B. a cooperative company engaged in the processing stage.  
Co.Pro.B.- Cooperativa Produttori Bieticoli s.c.a is the only Italian sugar producer having the form 
of a cooperative society. 
Its mission is to process beetroot, mostly granted by the member farms, in two sugar production 
plants and to sell sugar by its own network for selling Italian sugar.  
The Cooperative has 4.357 member farms, mostly located in Emilia Romagna and Veneto, which 
has some of the most suitable soil for beetroot cultivation.  
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The agreement concerns with sugar beet produced in North and Central Italy and can thus thought 
of having a national level nature. The agreement is designed in order to rule the processing of sugar 
beet and energy from the pulps. The Co.Pro.B. invested 100 millions of Euro in 2001 in order to 
enlarge the scale of the processing stage and biodigesters. The agreement require the Sugar Beet 
Producers Association to invest 35 millions of Euro in order to built on seven biodigesters dedicated 
to the production of bioenergy processing the pulps obtained from the sugar production. The 
economic (and organizational) sense of agreement relates to the complex evolution of the regulation 
of the sugar beet European market. Actually the sugar beet market and the activities of the 
agricultural production and processing stages are included within a National Plan of intervention 
issued by the Italian Ministry of Agricultural Policies. Nevertheless, the timing of the plan is held to 
be not adequately scheduled with respect to the emerging necessities of the sector.  
On the behalf of the associated producers, the Producers Associations have the decision right of 
designing and signing  specific agreements and contracts with energy suppliers delivering the bio-
energy produced by the biodigesters. Accordingly, the general agreement gives to the agricultural 
producers the right to withdraw a fixed amount of pulp. The amount is equal to 13.50% of the sugar 
beet production delivered to the processing plant. The input-output flows generated by the general 
agreement is illustrated in the figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Sugar Chain general agreement – Input-Output flows  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: the Authors 
 
The contractual agreement thus allocates a critical decision rights to the Producers Associations. 
This choice is motivated by the fact that at the contractual agreement outset an environmental 
uncertainty existed due to demand for energy which may be faced by the producers and to the 
management of the completion of the building on the biodigesters. These two sources of uncertainty 
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can be better faced by the Producers Associations both because their ability in managing the 
relationships with the agricultural producers and their ability in completing the investments. 
According to the Gibbons theory the critical aspects of the contractual agreement can be framed by 
through the following timing: 
 
Figure 3: Sugar Chain general agreement – Timing of adaptation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: the Authors 
 
4.2 The producers-processors contractual framework in the North-Italy Tomato Chain 
The of the general contractual agreement for the tomato production does not offer specific elements 
supporting the theoretical hypothesis here considered. 
We examined the Contract signed in 2010 by the Unaproa – a general association of Producers 
Associations – and the Associazione Italiana Industrie Prodotti Alimentari. The general agreement  
designs the contractual framework which provides the basic elements of the specific contract which 
will be signed by a Producers associations and the processors. This contributes to considers the 
Unaproa as a hybrid governance structure (Martino, Pampanini, 2006).   The general objective of 
the agreements is to design the guidelines for planning the production by through coordinating the 
activities of the agricultural and processing stages. The agreement if furthermore intended to 
promote the marketing of the product and the enhancement of the quality. The basic activities are 
expected to be carried out under a joint management of the both agricultural and industry party: 
 
- production planning; 
- information disclosing; 
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 
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Pay-off  U (a, 
d) received  
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- public monitoring supporting activities; 
- marketing planning; 
- quality improvement design and implementation; 
- implementing of the traceability system. 
 
The Unaproa has the decision rights of designing the services systems, namely the traceability 
system. This is the basis of crucial organizational innovation, nonetheless this right is not taken for 
granted in the general agreement or at least it is not explicitly allocated. We submit that all the 
critical uncertain elements are expected to be jointly managed by the parties. At the same time, the 
environmental uncertainty at stake concerns mainly the contingent fluctuations of the final demand. 
On the other hand the governance of the Tomato chain is made more complex  by a further level of 
general agreement the Tomato District, an association among several economic and policy agents 
established since 2007, in order to design and to carry out activities concerning: quality, innovation 
and efficiency. 
 
4.3 The producers-processors contractual framework in the North-Italy Potato Chain 
The Italian Union of Potatoes Producers’ Associations (Unione nazionale tra le associazioni dei 
produttori di patate, UNAPA), located in Rome, reunites 12 Associations and is officially 
recognised by the Italian Ministry for Agricultural Policies.  
UNAPA aims to represent, protect, assist and coordinate the associated organizations active in the 
potato processing industry, according to the  rules of the Common Market Organization. It enhances 
supply concentration and increase its value added, frame-contracts for the associated organizations. 
It promotes development of seed potatoes production, protection and value added for production 
and marketing of potatoes for fresh consumption and industrial use, helping to strengthen trade 
relations in the food supply chain.  
We take in consideration the 2008 general agreement signed by the UNAPA and three association 
of processing companies. The agreement is aimed at: 
 
- providing the frame for designing individual contracts between agricultural producers 
associations and processors; 
- promoting the experimenting of new forms of integration in order to face the competition in 
North Italy 
- regulating the mechanism of prices formation for the agricultural prices. 
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The general agreement includes specific formulas to determine the agricultural prices and also 
establishes qualitative standards. 
Notably the contract allocates decision rights to the parties: 
- the individual parties (e.g. a given agricultural producers association and a processor) have 
the right to negotiate betters terms; 
- both the farmers and the processors have the rights to choice the best technology they prefer 
(provide the quality constraint and objectives). 
-  
Figure 4: Potato Chain general agreement – Timing of adaptation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: the Authors 
 
 
 
4.4 The “Pollo d’erba” system 
The “Pollo d’Erba” case study considered  relates the project of integration of agents involved in the 
supply of organic poultry meat (Pampanini et al., 2009). This is a niche product obtained by 
traditional poultry genotypes with qualitative characteristics very different from the conventional 
poultry meat. The production system is based on a few simple rules entailing natural feeding and 
housing and a very low density (n. of head/m2). As a consequence the cost of production is larger 
than in the case of the conventional product and difficulties arise in efficiently organizing the 
supply system. This is also due to concentration of the poultry market. In this context the 
integration project was intended to establish a close coordination among the parties in order to 
structure their relationship and increase the possibilities of selling the product on selected market 
segments. 
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The integration project included the following main investments: a) Physical assets, at farms 
(Euro 255.500), intended to diffuse the poultry strains and to implement production protocol;  b) 
Elaboration and implementation of certification systems and of the set of technical and 
organizational rules needed to introduce the commercial brand “Pollo d’Erba” (Euro 283.280). 
 The total number of parties involved were: a) four agricultural farms; b) one agricultural 
cooperative; c) a national level Association of Organic Producers (Aiab); d) a regional 
Technological park. The productive and institutional relationships are illustrated in the figure 2 (the 
solid lines indicate the flow of product, while the dot lines indicate the institutional relationship). 
 
Figure 5: Case Pollo d’erba  - Institutional and productive relationships (Pampanini et al., 2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The five growers act as producer. They are in charge to make the investment identified by the 
general agreement signed by the parties under the supervision of the Regional Government of 
Umbria- However the producers have the right to choice the technology of the investment: i.e. the 
type of resources to be chosen and combined as well as the ways of using them in the context of the 
production plans agreed. The basic reasons for allocating this right to the producers is directly 
motivated by the Gibbons adaptation theory. The investments at stake will be directly managed by 
the growers within the organizational framework of their own farms. Therefore the growers 
experience and technological knowledge play a crucial role in ensuring the possibility of achieving 
the value added of the investments. Tyre and von Hippel (1997) make clear as individuals elaborate 
on their relations with physical assets in productive activities and give raise to complex processes of 
information exchange and elaboration as steps of human capital formation at the production process 
level. Accordingly, the growers directly management of the new investments allow them to 
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contribute to maximize the expected total surplus of the relationship in the sense of Gibbons. 
Furthermore, the experience of the growers allows them to take the right decision about the 
technology of the investment to be made, thus providing a further contribute to the maximization of 
the surplus.  
The general agreement allocate also to the producers the decision rights about the production plans. 
The number of the growers and the scale of the slaughterhouse plant are fixed, therefore the supply 
may vary just because of the rate of exploiting of the scale of the plant (see below) or because the 
variation of the output supplied by the growers. On the other hand, the growers can just use the 
resources they own or control to the purpose of the agreement, therefore to allocate to them the right 
to plan the production avoid to underutilize or stress the resources available and then allow the 
parties to contribute to maximize the surplus. 
The third decision right allocated to the growers concerns the their sales. The growers can sell their 
own product to buyer not included in the agreement up the 49% of their total product. This gives to 
the producers a very large number of degree of freedom.    
As for the Processor (the slaughterhouse company) - beyond the rights corresponding to the duties 
of the remaining parties (e.g. the right to process at least the 51% of the growers output) - the 
agreement explicitly mention only the assignment of duties (to slaughter, to channel to the market 
the output within the PDO umbrella, to pay to the grower a variable part of the price over the fixed 
payment agreed). It is a controversial point, as the agreement, for example, say nothing about the 
possibility for the processor to elaborate productive and trading strategies which will not threat the 
strategies supported by the agreement. In other words, the processor has the right to elaborate also 
strategies which may compete with the strategies agreed, but this right is nether recognized nor 
banned by the agreement in itself. However the task of elaborating marketing strategies includes the 
decision rights concerning several aspects of the practical activities which are influential on the 
whole performance of the agreement. The allocation of these rights can be predicted by the Gibbons 
theory: the processor is actually directly in touch with the distribution agents (see figure 2) and then 
she can better elaborate the marketing strategies. 
The Technological Park 3A acts a provider of services and has the right to design product and 
process innovation  and to provide them to the parties. The Park has also the right to provide 
specific marketing services which should be used by the parties in the context of the marketing 
strategies of the Processor. Also the rights allocated to the Park can be easily predicted by the 
Gibbons theory because of the specialization of the Park in both technological research and services 
provision.  
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Figure 6: Pollo d’erba  general agreement – Timing of adaptation  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: the Authors 
 
4.5 The producers-processors contractual framework of the Molini Popolari di Umbertide 
(Umbria) and of the Il Biroccio (Marche) 
In this paragreaph we present two cases concerning the cereals sector in two regions of Central 
Italy: Umbria (Molini Popolari di Umbertide) and Marche (Il Biroccio). The Molini Popolari di 
Umbertide designed a specific integration contract with 15 farms in the context of the 2007-2013 
Rural Development Plan (RDP) of Regione Umbria. Molini Popolari Riuniti, located in Umbertide 
(Perugia, Umbria) is a cooperative society that has grains storage and milling as its core business, 
but is also active in cattle and pigs breeding, extravirgin oil production, bread-making and feed 
production. The grains milling activity serves two chains:  feed production and bread-making.  
The agreement is aimed at better coordinate the activities of the farms and the cooperative 
enhancing their relationship in the face of the challenges posited by the competition. The agreement 
covers the 9% of the regional cereals production and involves  more than 3670 farms. The parties 
agreed on jointly carrying out the following activities: 
 
- to choose the genotypes; 
- to plan the production and to coordinate the agricultural supply with the processing stage; 
- to design individual crop contracts; 
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- to optimize the logistic activities; 
- to disclose information among the partners; 
- to define standard and to comply. 
 
Notably the agreement also allocate to the parties the decision rights about the investment to be 
made with the support of the RDP. Actually the parties agreed on investing 24,6millions of Euros 
both in the agricultural and in the processing stage. Nonetheless, the agreement describe exactly the 
investment which each party decided to do, according to her technological preferences and to the 
resources already managed.  
The Cooperative “Il Biroccio”, located in Filottrano (Ancona, Marche), processes and sells 
agricultural products of its own production or granted by its members. It manages two sales areas 
and sells its own products in mass-retailing stores. It also provides supplies for farming (to member 
farmers only) and manages its own land. 483 farms are members of the cooperative; they are 
located mostly in Filottrano and neighbouring towns.  
In the context of the RDP of the Regione Marche, the Cooperative “Il Biroccio” promoted the 
supply chain agreement known as “Futuro cereali delle Marche”. The objectives of the agreement 
are: 
- to improve the competitiveness of the farms; 
- to enhance efficiency; 
- to transfer technology; 
- to experiment cropping technology; 
- to increase the agricultural value added. 
 
The activities aimed at achieving these objectives are the following: 
- to provide extension services; 
- to make investments both in the agricultural and the processing stage; 
- to design new productive patterns 
- to certificate the products 
As in the case of the Molini Popolari di Umbertide, the general agreement allocate to the parties 
expected to maximize the total surplus the decision right on making investments. 
The figure 7 summarize the adaptation timing identified for both the cases. 
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Figure 7: The Molini Popolari and Il Biroccio general agreements – Timing of adaptation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: the Authors 
 
 
 
4.6 A synthesis  
The case study provides a basic confirmation of the theoretical prediction concerning the allocation 
of  critical decision rights across the firms boundaries. The Table 2 summarizes the decision rights 
allocated and associates them to the sources if uncertainty identified. 
 
Table 2: Decision rights and sources of uncertainty 
DECISION RIGHTS ALLOCATED  
CASES 
 
SOURCES OF 
UNCERTAINTY 
Size and 
type of 
invstements 
Production 
plans 
Market 
plan 
Individual 
negotiation 
Freedom of 
trade 
North Italian 
Sugar Chain 
Technology, Quality  
X 
 
X 
   
North-Italy 
Tomato 
Chain 
 
Technology, Quality  
X 
 
X 
  
X 
 
North-Italy 
Potato Chain 
Technology, Quality, 
Market 
  none 
Pollo d’Erba 
system 
Technology, Quality, 
Environmental 
sutainability 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
  
X 
Molini 
Popolari di 
Umbertide  
 
Technology, Quality,  
 
X 
 
 
X 
   
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 
Governance structure 
negotiation, with allocation 
of decision rights  to the 
take the ex post decisions 
dN 
 
Producers:  
- to decide the 
investments 
 
 
Processor 
 
- to decide the 
investments 
 
Ex ante action chosen 
aC 
  
Ordinary production 
and marketing 
acitivites 
Interim signals 
observed 0 
- technology 
available 
- consumers 
expectations 
- funding  
Ex post decision 
taken d= (N, dN): 
 
 
Producers:  
 
-Investment made 
 
 
-Production plans 
 
 
Processor 
 
Pay-off  U (a, 
d) received  
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Il Biroccio 
 
Technology, Quality, 
 
X 
 
 
X 
   
Source: the Authors 
Therefore we submit that the findings corroborate our conjecture. The sources of uncertainty deal 
with the environmental uncertainty and mainly concerns with technology and quality or compliance 
with standards defined in the general contractual framework. The case of the  North-Italy Potato 
Chain provides a disconfirming evidence which here is interpreted in terms of the various level of 
contracting. Beyond the differences in the institutional environments, the cases also differ because 
of the degree of integration. The expectations on the ex post uncertainty solution is often explicitly 
taking into consideration by the parties. 
 
 
 
5. Final remarks 
The study concerns the integration of the activities in agro-industry chains. The analytical 
framework motivates the conjecture that the allocation of decision rights is central to the negotiation 
of organizational arrangement along the chains investigated. The empirical analysis shows that, 
among other, the negotiation concentrates of the allocation of decision rights relating to uncertain 
circumstance. Innovation issues, quality (and safety) objectives and consumers behaviours seems 
the main circumstances requiring the allocation of critical decision rights. Therefore the ex ante 
allocation of decision rights is critical to the economic and environmental sustainable strategies. 
The study of the environmental uncertainty appear to be critical to the design of modes of 
integration in agro-industry chain and therefore to their expected performance. 
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